Black Natural Law
By
6.4.17 |
Symposium Introduction
After Ferguson, Sandra Bland, Charlotte, NC, Bresha Meadows, and a host of recent black victims of the injustice of our criminal legal system, can one have faith in the law of the land? If it had not been already, many are beginning to see the failure of the criminal legal system and appeals to justice from the law as inescapably fraught. The inability of the judges, juries, lawyers and politicians tasked with ensuring justice to discern instances of injustice that seem so clear to black people, the law’s inability to indict or convict police officers who are caught on tape murdering black people—either directly or through neglect—seems to be a sign of the law’s collusion (and perhaps fundamental alignment) with antiblackness in the United States. Still, in the wake of the law’s failure, where can we turn? Is there any hope of things changing if the state and its legal systems are fundamental incapable of providing justice? If the notion of justice that the state appeals to is fundamentally unjust and reproduces injustice as a way of life, must the law simply be discarded?
Vincent Lloyd’s Black Natural Law provides one response to this impasse by turning to an under-explored element of well known black thinkers—their appeals to natural law. Against both conservative, European understandings of natural law and secular multicultural narrations of law and religion, Lloyd argues that attending to the black natural law tradition and its fracturing will enable us to better know and do justice here and now. Rather than a notion of law that is reduced to either law and order or to individualistic notions of love, Lloyd argues for a complex texture to black natural law tradition that understands the importance of uniting action, affect, and reason for the advancement of social justice. Thus, the black natural law tradition has two aims which guide its expression: ideology critique and social movement organizing. By examining the interplay between these two, Lloyd seeks to shake off the impoverished notions of justice that remain when we accept secular or conservative Christian notions of law and tradition. For Lloyd, this creates more room for a rich engagement with black religious thought.
“Educate, agitate, organize” is a common principle in movement building and grassroots organizing. In Black Natural Law, Lloyd gives us an illustration of how black thinkers can be said to constitute a black natural law tradition in a way that aligns with these principles. Considering four foundational figures in black political thought (Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, W.E.B. DuBois, and Martin Luther King Jr.), Lloyd uses the black natural law tradition as a focus point to make the compelling case for blackness as the primary starting point for all political action and work against injustice. The black natural law tradition thus becomes a means of educating the reader on the uses of natural law in black politics and religion, and also serves to contest the understanding of the natural law tradition as promulgated by white, conservative reason. Against the flattening of natural law discourse into a conservatizing impulse, Lloyd shows how multiple traditions of natural law can be accounted for by showing how black natural law is a useful and necessary tradition (indeed, the most significant natural law tradition) that theologians and activists concerned with justice should draw from, recover, and expand. In so doing, Lloyd compelling argues that “affect, ideology critique, and performance must all be part of a story about justice—about injustice in the world we have and about how we can move toward a more just world” (xiv).
Within this story about justice, each figure taken for consideration reveals something about how black natural law informs understandings of affect, ideology critique, and performance to engender more justice—its discernment and its practice. Frederick Douglas is shown to be a skilled orator whose speeches effectively challenge the slaveholding law of the land through appeals to a higher law. These proclamations, grounded in a uniting of emotion and reason, work hand in hand in the pursuit of God’s law—that is, the abolition of slavery and black freedom. Anna Julia Cooper’s skill as an educator and organizer is brought to the fore in a way that takes her seriously as a strategist whose appeals to God’s law ground her claims that black women have a privileged role to play in the struggle for justice. Against readings of her as simply beholden to respectability politics, Lloyd shows how her negotiation of gender politics reveal an astute and creative leader who utilized claims about God’s law as a way of educating others in the practice of negotiating complex political terrain. In some ways, this aligns with an argument like Delores Williams’ regarding a quality of life/survival ethic as a central insight of black women’s history. Lloyd finds that Du Bois’ work on the soul and religion reveals the connection between natural law and the perception of humanity and injustices against humanity. Du Bois’ exploration of the souls of black folks shows that the black condition reveals a higher law which grants black people an epistemic privilege in recognizing the apophatic nature of humanity and the white lie that black people are objects rather than human. Du Bois’ use of natural law thus reveals the souls of white folks as deformed by racism and unable to perceive the reality of humanity and injustice. Consequently, whites are incapable of knowing the good, the true, and the beautiful without becoming educated by the black condition and subject to the black struggle for freedom. Finally, Lloyd recovers the radicalism of King’s appeals to natural law against the secular narration of him which would reduce his religious concepts and rhetoric to political opportunism. Instead, Lloyd highlights an adept and astute intellectual and rhetorician who contributes to the black natural law tradition by highlighting the necessity of continual discernment of a higher law which may require we become maladjusted to the status quo—a maladjustment which can aid us in refusing arrogance in maintain critical reflection as we strategically organize for justice.
Whether the book makes good on its intention to reveal this tradition’s relevance for today is what primarily concerns the respondents to Lloyd’s monograph. Luke Bretherton wonders about the accuracy of Lloyd’s depiction of black natural law as the predominant framework for the figures he considers and whether Lloyd loses something of the specific theological content of appeals to natural law traditions by relying on an abstract metaphysics. Still, Bretherton finds reading Lloyd’s work as performing a black natural law critique in its style and argument clarifies his treatment of his subjects. Courtney Bryant contends that the diversity of black responses to oppression gets lost in Lloyd’s narration of them as a coherent black natural law tradition. This leads her to wonder how authority gets deployed in such a narration and the importance of negotiating between a plurality of incongruent black visions for justice. Carol Wayne White extends the critical engagement with Lloyd by questioning the theological nature of Lloyd’s argument. She takes issue, especially, with the absence of naturalism and non-theistic humanism and animism in his account of figures like Anna Julia Cooper. Gregory Williams sees much promise in Lloyd’s advancement of a black natural law tradition and hopes this text will lead to a greater development of this tradition—especially its “apophatic humanism.” Finally, Andre C. Willis is welcoming of Lloyd’s illumination of the strategic and affective dimensions of a black natural law tradition but wonders if the appeal to a higher law falls back into a problematic Christian metaphysic and whether Lloyd’s reading of his chosen figures overdetermines their use of natural law rather than showing its strategic deployment. In their responses to the book and Lloyd’s conversation with each author, it becomes clear that Black Natural Law provides a fruitful (if contentious) site for further clarifying black conceptions of justice, organizing, strategy, critique, and the role of theology in black struggle.
While Black Natural Law might appear to simply reproduce a declension narrative, Lloyd is attempting something more interesting here and eschews Rod Dreher-esque handwringing and nostalgia for a lost time. Instead, as Bretherton also points out, Lloyd is out to perform something of what he’s writing about and so reinvigorate our ability to imagine the black natural law tradition as an aid to failing better in the struggle for justice and liberation. Thus Black Natural Law reads as an attempt to persuade, to educate the mind and the emotions, to reveal injustice, and point to a way forward through organizing and ideology critique. This becomes most clear when Lloyd closes out the book with a rousing abolitionist call:
The challenge of America’s racist legal system offers an opportunity to confirm and refine the black natural law tradition. Focusing on one or another law to be fixed tempts us to forget what is most basic in that tradition: ideology critique and social movement organizing. Confronting the racist legal system teaches blacks to look suspiciously on the wisdom of the world, to work together to build power, and to patiently wait until the right moment to rise up and destroy the demonic forces that hold more than a million of our black brothers and sisters in cage. (147)
Thus, part of the aim of this book is to contribute to a tradition, black natural law, that can account for human nature in such a way that it can strike a powerful blow and speak a powerful word against the injustices found in our current criminal legal system. These actions would not seek to either discard the law or sacralize the unjust law of the current order. Instead, Black Natural Law presents resources for making the case against the laws of this world without appealing to a superssessionist logic—a force that comes from outside the world to violently fix the world through overcoming the law. In the appeal to natural law, the black condition becomes a privileged site of revelation of God’s law. Still, like blackness, this higher law is always opaque, requiring discernment, critique, and organizing that educates our reason, emotions, and actions in the true, the good, and the beautiful. Further, since this law is found through discernment, organizing, and education on the black condition it refuses an ideal triune harmony or sovereign state that sets the world right. Rather than deploying a narration of justice that requires an overcoming of blackness through participation in a divinity or a legal structure that erases the black condition, Lloyd shows how it is only in and through an education in the black condition that an account of the human and natural law can be given. When taken as an anti-supersessionist account of law, the desire to recover a black natural law tradition becomes clearer. For, without the appeal to a higher law, a divine law, it seems that life and death, especially black life and death, is stuck—subject to the whims of the laws of this world, stuck appealing to a state that shows no ability to recognize the humanity of black people. Turning to a black natural law tradition, then, is one way of both indicting the current criminal legal structure with its reproduction of injustice and, at the same time, advancing a conception of God and the human person—her actions, intellect, and affect—that can affirm a black abolitionist struggle for justice.
6.12.17 |
Response
Vincent Lloyd’s Black Natural Law “Tradition”: Concerns Fissures and Questions
Introduction & Overview
In Black Natural Law, Vincent Lloyd recovers a black natural law tradition (BNLT) that he argues has collapsed in the wake of the ’60s Civil Rights movement. Lloyd believes this BNLT offers a distinctive view of human nature that surpasses other conceptions of humanity found in comparable natural law traditions; this tradition both “appreciates the mix of reason, emotion, and imagination that make up our humanity” and asserts that human nature is “ultimately unrepresentable” (ix; xi). According to Lloyd, this BNLT also enacts a type of strategic wisdom that targets ideology critique and engages in social movement organizing (xii; xiii). Finally, for Lloyd, the unfolding of this BNLT can be seen in the life, work, and reflections of four iconic figures, whom he shows as performing natural law: Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Martin Luther King (xii).
There are many layers to Lloyd’s provocative study; however, in this brief essay, I focus on Lloyd’s depiction of the “concept of the human” in BNLT, which he states is the basis for this tradition’s normativity. I remain curious about the explicit a priori theistic commitments in configuring the human that Lloyd associates with all of the figures he investigates. I also raise questions about the “normative” claims that Lloyd makes about this tradition’s normative claims, namely, that “black natural law offers the best way to approach politics, not just for blacks but for everyone. . . . It is the approach that ought to be taken” (ix). I then conclude with a few general observations, asking if the BNLT is capacious enough to justify the normative claims that Lloyd makes for it.
Lloyd’s Theological Basis for Constructing Our Common Humanity
Lloyd’s general aim in this study is laudable. He retrieves and indicates the persuasive power of a BNLT amid a national crisis, poignantly and aptly described as “two million imprisoned Americans whose human nature is systematically denied” (162). The importance of his work is magnified even more when one considers the enduring legacy of white supremacy in a Euro-American lineage of thought that has helped shape an exclusionary category of the human, designating who is properly so and who is not. Even up to the present day, modernist processes of racialization repeatedly characterize people of African descent as deficient when measured against the construction of the normative Western human of Enlightenment thought (Eze 1996; Mills 1997; Stefancic and Delgado 2013).
As Lloyd develops and justifies the BNLT’s conception of humanity, he references a metaphysical component that is beyond human comprehension: “The black natural law tradition is committed to the view that no worldly description of the human suffices. Just as God exceeds all worldly description, the image of God in humanity exceeds all worldly description” (xi). When presenting the four iconic figures’ perspectives on the God concept, Lloyd does not fully theoretically demonstrate whether each figure’s view is consistent with the others. Given their diverse allegiances, historical eras, and modes of reflecting, as well as their varying cosmological and philosophical frameworks, some form of synthesizing may be warranted. My primary interest, however, is not Lloyd’s lack of systematic theorizing in presenting the “God” concept; rather, it is his contention that a theologically based view of human nature is shared by all figures, allowing Lloyd to recover a seamless BNLT.
Lloyd begins his examination with the figure of Frederick Douglass, using Douglass’s natural law theory as paradigmatic of the BNLT (2). Accordingly, Lloyd suggests that Douglass’s “complex” view of human nature, admittedly drawn from many inconsistent descriptions, is striking in its focus on “the expansive, one might even say spiritual, life of all human beings” (7). For Lloyd, Douglass’s view suggests that we are not reducible to our animal nature. Continuing his discussion of Douglass’s views of human nature, Lloyd adds to the “typical” admixture of reason and emotion, a catalogue of other important qualities and capacities. For example, among other qualities, humans can resist, believe, and also doubt; unlike animals, they are able to make progress, to remember, and to reason; humans also possess self-awareness of temporality, and they have the knowledge to distinguish between the human and the non-human (7, 8). Lloyd does not stop there. He also identifies a definitive theological (theistic) component to Douglass’s perspectives, which he presents as Douglass’s sense of the “irreducible” mystery that separates humans from animals and allows humans to identify with God (6, 8). Douglass’s God appears to be the biblically based anthropomorphic deity of traditional Judaism and Christianity. Consequently, the various human qualities “mark the ways in which humans reflect the image of God” (8).
Lloyd follows this schema when discussing each figure. In his section on Cooper, for example, he presents Cooper’s interpretation of human nature as a fusion of reason and emotion, blended in a complex “dynamic mix” (33). He then contends that Cooper’s perspectives on human nature are complemented with her views on God (35, 36, 43, 44); in some cases, as with Douglass, Lloyd even suggests that Cooper’s views are not necessarily exercises in rhetoric (42). The same general pattern, with varying points of emphasis, differences, and clarifications that allow for the specificities of the individual, is found in Lloyd’s treatments of Du Bois (66, 70, 74, 75) and King (103, 104, 105, 110).
As interpreted by Lloyd, the performance of natural law theory by all figures exemplifies the BNLT’s conception of humanity that is understood only within the context of a set of metaphysical affirmations based on a dualistic view of reality. With these portrayals, Lloyd justifies his notion that “black natural law calls us to honor the higher law that acknowledges our humanity by actively challenging the wisdom of the world” (x). Lloyd’s use of religious language is perplexing to me, as it seems to revitalize the Eliadian worldview of the profane and the sacred (Eliade 1987). This dualistic cosmology seems central to Lloyd’s discussion of the advent of secularism in the final pages (150). On p. xiv, Lloyd asserts, “The black natural law tradition certainly uses religious language, but it is legible—and persuasive—without any commitment to any specific theological beliefs or participation in any religious practices.” In reading Lloyd’s assertions, however, I sense a theological rather than religious task in this study. For example, Lloyd consistently employs traditional Christian theological anthropology in characterizing the BNLT (xiv, 6, 10, 38, 40). The result for me as a reader is that the complexity of religious symbolic language utilized by the various figures are collapsed into a formulaic God symbol.
Fissures in BNLT: Other Possible Perspectives
Conspicuously absent in Lloyd’s study are Anna Julia Cooper’s naturalized and humanistic views of human nature and W. E. B. Du Bois’s anti-metaphysical leanings, both of which fissure the seamless theological portrait Lloyd presents. When introducing the young Cooper, Lloyd states that “religion offered her a way of embracing the connections among all human beings” (34); he also infers that this pious Christian temperament remained in Cooper as she aged and informed her conception of human nature (35). In the collection of essays, A Voice from the South, however, Cooper writes not merely as a pious Christian, but also as a humanist. Throughout the volume, she presents a nuanced view of humanity that is supported by her understanding of the prescripts of nature, in which she saw egalitarian principles at work (Cooper 1988, 71, 177–78). She also employs naturalistic metaphors alongside religious ones, characterizing humans as evolving, perfecting, and maturing processes with inner-determination (Cooper 1988, 244, 258, 297). Cooper expresses US blacks’ desires for fulfillment as universal aspirations that supersede cultural and even religious differences among people (Cooper 1988, 113; 108).
In “The Gain from a Belief,” Cooper argues for a view of humanity as a material, dynamic entity capable of transformation under the proper conditions necessary for its cultivation (Cooper 1988, 244). Cooper adamantly targeted a crass materialism that she ultimately rejected with her brand of religious humanism: “Life must be something more than dilettante speculation. And religion (ought to be if it isn’t) a great deal more than mere gratification of the instinct for worship linked with the straight-teaching of irreproachable credos. Religion must be life made true, and life is action, growth, development—begun now and ending never” (Cooper 1988, 299).
Lloyd often makes his case for Du Bois’s theological anthropology by drawing on Du Bois’s earlier writings, such as Souls of Black Folk (1903) and Darkwater (1920). These two works, for Lloyd, combine Du Bois’s empirical studies and literary sensibilities. Rather than demonstrate that Du Bois himself argues as a natural law theorist, Lloyd suggests it is sufficient to show that normative judgments flow from Du Bois’s reflections on human nature. Lloyd then contends that Du Bois portrays blacks as having privileged access both to “the ways that God’s image is present in human nature” and “to God” (59). Furthermore, Lloyd notes that Du Bois sees blacks using their insights to change the world for the better, and that Du Bois implicitly argues this can be done by their attempts to “implement natural law” (59).
I share Lloyd’s sense of Du Bois’s appreciation of the rich semiotic significance of religious symbolism in black religion. However, I think he ignores important writings of Du Bois that are replete with anti-theistic articulations and anti-metaphysical leanings when describing blacks’ rights to fullness of life vis-à-vis their accountability of their own humanity (Du Bois 1968, 285; Du Bois 1970, 111; Du Bois 1978; Du Bois 1995, 134). Lloyd and I also interpret Du Bois’s perspectives in Souls differently. In my reading, Du Bois’s interpretations are in line with his empirically based humanism (White 2016, 88ff.), whereas Lloyd often cast Du Bois’s words in a theological idiom that supports Lloyd’s theistic agenda (78). Other examples include Lloyd featuring Du Bois’s purported eschatological views (73) as expressions found only in works of fiction (Lloyd 2018, 74–75), while often minimizing Du Bois’s conceptions of a self-determined black humanity governed by a sense of purposive living. In public speeches and personal correspondence, Du Bois’s anti-metaphysical views and socialist sensibilities have him emphasizing human ingenuity within the context of raced living in the United States. In a 1956 letter to Herbert Aptheker, he writes:
I assumed that human beings could alter and re-direct the course of events as to better human conditions. I knew that this power was limited by environment, inheritance and natural law, and that from the point of view of science these occurrences must be a matter of Chance and not of Law. I did not rule out the possibility of some God also influencing and directing human action and natural law. However I saw no evidence of such divine guidance. I did see evidence of the decisive action of human beings. (Du Bois 1978, 395–96)
Theological Anthropology, Normative Claims, and Questions of Justice
The fissures I read within Lloyd’s portrayal of human nature in the BNLT lead me to consider his normative claims. According to Lloyd, the normative implications of this BNLT’s conception of human nature are so compelling that all ethical and political theory ought to start with the insights of blacks (xiii). Furthermore, recalling the BNLT points to “a powerful resource to revitalize and orient normative inquiry in black studies” (xiii). The boldness of these claims has me wondering if Lloyd’s sense of the BNLT is capacious enough to address the complex and diverse forms of injustice in America today. Can this theologically formulaic approach encompass the varied, emerging conceptions and enactments of black humanity as some of us experience today? For example, can Lloyd’s BNLT creatively address the excluded humanity that queer, transgendered, and other marginalized sexualized beings experience in our unjust world? Granted, Lloyd implicitly acknowledges some of these important issues in his discussions of James Baldwin and Audre Lorde (122–29). However, I am not fully persuaded by his accounts of their views, which I think are much more complex when set within queer theory. I also object to his final critique that their perspectives are insufficient because “both offer inadequate accounts of politics” (129). I think Lloyd fails to incorporate the wider communal, sociopolitical, and ethical implications of (black) humanity that Lorde and Baldwin enacted by daring to “queer” normative views of humanity, thereby challenging problematic, monolithic views of sexuality, erotic-affective desires, femininity, and masculinity in the United States.
While deeply appreciating Lloyd’s movement from the restrictive account of natural law he often associates with European rationalist traditions, I also detect a residual androcentricism in his account of this BNLT. This androcentricism seems anachronistic when considering current ecological appraisals of the essential interconnectedness of life (Ralston 2006, 911). Additionally, current developments and empirical studies in animal studies may undermine Lloyd’s sense that reasoning, feeling and imagining are characteristically human capacities (Bekoff 2008; Waal 2016; Safina 2016). As a religious naturalist, I see Lloyd’s BNLT reinscribing a cultural fantasy of human exceptionalism, which assumes that the human is not a spatial, temporal web of interspecies dependencies (Haraway 2008, 3–4). The concept of the autonomous human has lent theoretical support to popular myths of the self-made individual in the United States, which is antithetical to the social, communal view that Lloyd champions. Given Lloyd’s critique of the rationalist bent in other Euro-American models, Lloyd’s implicit speciesism is an ironic dimension of this particular rendering of the BNLT.
Finally, given that we find ourselves in the anthropocene facing forms of ecological destruction, I have doubts about Lloyd’s BNLT’s capacity to function as a normative tool within black studies. I remain skeptical that its current theological-based configuration of human nature can help us identify and politically resist the ill effects of white supremacy on all of life. Lloyd is silent, for example, about the important political organizing done by black (and other racialized) communities in the environmental justice movement. Often without any explicit theological anthropology, this movement appeals to a view of humanity that is inseparable from other natural processes. It has also produced generations of activists of color engaged in struggles to advance natural resource conservation, environmental protection, civil rights, and social equity (Glave 2010; Finney 2014; Cole & Foster 2001). These important ecological values, along with other ones that Lloyd associates with Douglass, Cooper, Du Bois, and King, are necessary, I believe, to promote a view of black humanity that is interconnected with all of life.
6.19.17 |
Response
Apophatic Humanism
Vincent Lloyd’s latest volume can be situated within an economy of recent works which call into question what was often assumed about natural law, both by its proponents (the “new natural law” theorists, John Finnis et al.) and by its critics (usually Barthians of some stripe or another). This assumption was that natural law is an attempt to “read” moral data off of creation, that, while this attempt cannot come up with all the data that Christian revelation provides, it can provide some clear, “common sense” answers to moral questions, and that these answers can be held in common by all right thinking people, whatever their particular tradition (Christian or non-Christian) or social location.
The problems with this position have long since been made clear, both by the postliberal insistence that there is no such thing as a tradition-neutral stance on moral questions and that moral reasoning always (literally) comes to terms with the world in a specific language cultivated by a particular community, and in the liberationist insight, derived from a robust engagement by theology with subaltern studies and postcolonial theory, that what is named as “natural” and “obvious” within a particular order of knowing is often, if not always, that which has been rendered “natural” and “obvious” by a particular order of power. It has been made to appear “natural,” in various times and places, that there are innate differences between the races, that the biological differences between men and women make men, and only men, fit for full citizenship, and that the exclusive purpose of sexual intercourse is procreation within lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual marriages. Natural law, then, has often been seen as a way of obfuscating the machinations of social power, sanctioning the “common sense” of Empire by divine fiat, and rendering the desires of working class and oppressed people for emancipation, or even for bare existence, “contrary to nature.”
While it would take an essay in itself to flesh out this line of criticism in its entirety, it seems safe to posit, for the purposes of reading Lloyd’s text, that this critique does, in fact, hold, for much natural law theory. This begs the question: is natural law to be abandoned? The answer, among both postliberals and liberationists, has, generally, been “yes” for a very long time. Political theology and Christian ethics in both of these schools of thought has tended to emphasize the apocalyptic, revelatory character of moral discourse, and to devalue “nature” as a locus for moral reflection with goods proper to it. Whether this means devaluing “creation,” too, is a separate issue, which cannot be covered here.
Now, as Lloyd points out, this tendency has extended even the category of the human. Thanks, in large part, to the engagement between Christian theology and Afro-pessimism, the claim “that Western metaphysics or theology has rooted deep within it a commitment to the dehumanization of black bodies” and that the “very concept of the human has been defined in such a way as to exclude blacks” has gained significant traction (145), bringing the rejection of natural law to completion in a rejection of humanity itself. For Lloyd, this rejection of nature in general and human nature in particular is deeply problematic, resulting in “a solipsistic retreat into the supposedly foreclosed self” (146). If the real world, peopled with beings that are really human, is not a site for moral reflection and action, then there is no possibility for concrete interventions by practically wise human agency to transform, to convert the world as it is into something more like the world as it should be. It may be true, as Marx puts it, that philosophers need to move from merely describing the world to changing it, but if there is no world that can be meaningfully described, then change is manifestly impossible, and the result is a theology and politics of hopelessness.
Black Natural Law, then, is one of a number of recently published works that are beginning to fill a crucial need: for reflection on nature—human nature and the broader nature in which humans live, move, and have their being—as a site of moral action and analysis which is not reducible to hegemonic forms of “common sense.” It is not the first, nor will it be the last, project to make this attempt. For example, Eugene Rogers’s Aquinas and the Supreme Court: Race, Gender, and the Failure of Natural Law in Thomas’s Biblical Commentaries (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) argues that “Aquinas believes there is such a thing as natural law, but he is also completely comfortable admitting that we don’t, in fact, know what it is” (26). In other words, like Lloyd, Rogers, wants to affirm that the “natural” and “apocalyptic” dimensions of theology and ethics are not at odds with one another, that affirming that human nature and nature as a whole has moral content to it does not mean saying that that content is equally obvious to everyone, much less that it can be reducible to any sort of “common sense.” Rogers, Lloyd, and others in this emerging school of “dissenting natural law” or “subaltern natural law” want to affirm that natural law can, in fact, be subversive, that it can, in Lloyd’s words, condemn “worldly laws that flow from a faulty account of human nature” (20).
Yet Lloyd’s work also stands out from this emerging school of thought for two related reasons. First, Lloyd stands in continuity with classical liberation theology insofar as he wants to strongly affirm the epistemic priority of the oppressed. For W. E. B. Du Bois, for example, “experiencing oneself as a different sort of creature than how one is treated, experiencing oneself as a human rather than as a thing, offers insight into what it means to be human” (70). This epistemic privilege is intrinsic to a key aspect of Lloyd’s formulation of natural law, which could be termed “apophatic humanism.” Put in classical Christian terms, because human beings are made in the image and likeness of God, because movement into the life of the Trinity is the very principle of their being, and because the triune God whom Christians worship in Jesus Christ is infinite, without limit, there are no fixed definitions that can fully capture what it means to be human. For Anna Julia Cooper, for example, “what is most essentially human . . . is infinite possibility” (53). In fact, definitions that seek to capture human being tend to be the cultural productions of, and technologies for reproducing, regimes of social and political power that capture human beings—slavery, and, together with it and on the basis of it, colonialism and capitalism, cissexism and heteropatriarchy. Insofar as this is the case, people who live on the underside of those regimes will stand the best chance of grasping that simplistic definitions like “human beings are creatures that possess reason” or “human beings are intelligent animals who control their environment through technology” are just that—simplistic, and, in religious terms, idolatrous.
This epistemic privilege of the oppressed raises the second major way that Lloyd’s work stands out from other recent attempts at a dissident formulation of natural law. Unlike someone like Rogers, who is explicitly engaged in a critical ressourcement of a major figure in the eurowestern Christian tradition, Thomas Aquinas, Lloyd’s work directs the attention of those who would have a subaltern approach to natural law and human nature to actually existing subaltern communities, and the dissident intellectuals by whom those communities are served, and through whom their understanding of the good is “made more unitary and coherent” (Gramsci, 1971, 634). Instead of reading Thomas Aquinas or even Gregory of Nyssa, Lloyd has written a book on natural law that takes Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Martin Luther King Jr. for its primary subjects. This alone is a radical (and highly generative) move. But Lloyd goes further. He also “suggests that the black natural law tradition gets things right. To put the claim strongly, black natural law offers the best way to approach politics, not just for blacks but for everybody” (ix). There are (at least) two possible ways of reading this claim. On one hand, it could be read reductively, as saying that Black Natural Law should replace the eurowestern Christian tradition as a way of thinking about political ethics. Unfortunately, there will almost certainly be some who take Lloyd in this way, and, on this basis, refuse to take his argument on its own terms. On the other hand, one can read Lloyd as saying that Black Natural Law gets at something real, something that the eurowestern Christian tradition has sometimes tried to evoke but has often failed to articulate. Black Natural Law, on this reading, sounds an echo in the best part of the eurowestern Christian soul, that part which is not fully possessed by the powers of Empire, and hails a new and ancient promise for the redemption of creation by the power of divine love and justice.
What I am calling Lloyd’s “apophatic humanism” is just one example of how this can work—though it is far from the only one. Gregory of Nyssa, for instance, affirmed that, as the image of God, humans are “an incomprehensible image of the incomprehensible,” that is, he had an “apophatic anthropology” as “the consequence of an apophatic theology” (Tanner, 2009, 118). This understanding of the freedom intrinsic to the human as the image of God has radical consequences—Gregory’s opposition to slavery, for example: as J. Kameron Carter puts it, “the notion of the image is what orients Gregory’s posture as an abolitionist intellectual” (Carter, 2008, 242).
Yet this powerful theological resource for organized resistance to slavery and other forms of domination has been largely ignored by a Christian tradition that has sought to place a firm definition on the human as a rational autonomous chooser, that is, as free, propertied, and male. This is the process that Sylvia Wynter has forcefully called the “overdetermination” of the human as Western Man, and it has led Afro-pessimists, including Carter, to seek to do without the category of the human altogether, a move that Lloyd condemns. By showing how apophatic humanism works in the thought of four of the most powerful organic intellectuals in US history, and how it has played a concrete role in their articulation of the black freedom movement’s efforts to challenge racism and white supremacy in American laws and social norms, Lloyd pulls political theology and social ethics back from the brink of this nihilistic, anti-humanist abyss, and gives an account that is faithful to what the Christian tradition, pace Gregory, has tried, at its best, to evoke, and, frankly, that is more faithful to Wynter than many of her theological appropriators are, since she, arguably, wants to speak out against the “overdetermination” of the human, not against the human full stop.
Lloyd, then, is right when he claims that Black Natural Law, while constituted within a particular tradition of resistance in the United States, is a way of thinking about nature in general and human nature in particular that is open to everybody. Those who are interested in doing Christian theology and ethics in a liberative key should be particularly interested in the book, not only because it assigns epistemic privilege to the oppressed in theory, but performs that priority in its very written pages, pointing to a way of describing and changing the world that still has much to teach us as we confront the evils of police power, the carceral state, and other powers of Empire which seek to vitiate and destroy black life in America, and so to cheapen and denigrate the lives of working-class and oppressed people everywhere. We stand in need of a new generation of Black Natural Law theorists and practitioners, and hopefully Lloyd’s volume can help to name that need, and call a new generation to fill it.
7.3.17 |
Response
Reflections on Black Natural Law
There is always a bit of the subject’s desire already in the law and always a bit of the law already in the subject’s desire.
—Maria Aristodemou, Law, Psychoanalysis, Society
The point of departure for the most recent book in Vincent Lloyd’s rapidly expanding corpus is his contention that at its best, African American ethical and political engagement reflects the style of a distinctive yet dying tradition of natural law to which black people have “privileged access” (xiii). Lloyd prioritizes the importance of notions like “‘God’s law,” “universal law” or “higher law” (he uses these terms interchangeably) for the black intellectual heritage and its associated freedom struggles. This book is an important contribution to the fields of black political thought, theology and legal studies as it thoughtfully directs our attention to the vital role that African Americans have played in publicly articulating a unique human rights discourse that has emphasized “the eternal, universal and indestructible” (20) elements of an ultimately ineffable human nature.
Black Natural Law attempts to skillfully re-situate the wisdom of the Christian-inflected black political tradition as a distinctive line of natural law activism with important normative and performative features. On my reading, two major threads run throughout the text: a descriptive, historical thread that situates four “mainstream” (vii) black ethical and political leaders within a black natural law tradition; and a normative, aspirational strand that contends the black natural law approach is “the best way to approach politics, not just for blacks but for everyone” (ix).
Descriptively, Lloyd links his thesis to a historical treatment that cuts against the grain of conventional interpretations of four seminal black freedom fighters: Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Martin Luther King Jr., whom he reads as participants in a revised tradition of natural law. Each of the four chapters is nicely detailed and powerfully argued. Overall, these fruitful interpretations aim to demonstrate that at its most effective, the black religio-political heritage effectively dramatizes firm theological and metaphysical commitments such as the notions that God exists, that humans are created in God’s image, that freedom is the natural right of all human beings, and that equality is guaranteed by higher law.
Lloyd’s master narrative of a black natural law style of politics—whose core content he determines to be “ideology critique” and “social movement organizing”—highlights the importance of the affective features of black subjects. Instead of cognition and reason, for Lloyd it is our emotive and imaginative faculties that discern the norms of freedom and equality. He is careful, however, to accentuate the limits of human discernment. He notes that humans can never achieve complete knowledge of human nature or fully implement God’s law, and we cannot successfully codify natural law or firmly establish its determinative content.
It is worth emphasizing that for Lloyd, the discoverable content of black natural law is discerned via a process that starts from the stable center of our humanity (a place that is ultimately unknowable), not from our sociopolitical conditions. His worry seems to be that when we allow our political work to be guided by categories that “obscure the soul, such as race, gender, and class” (40) we inhibit both proper self-orientation and spiritual alignment with others. In other words, we cannot fully understand the transcendent aspects of ourselves and others unless our actions are based in a sense of something bigger than us. On Lloyd’s account then, to start from the fixed yet ineffable center of the soul is to inspire proper discernment. This helps us both to avoid political work marked by the relativism and essentialism of multicultural approaches (that work from definitive contemporary conditions), and to resist the secularism and problem-solving language of pragmatic approaches to politics (that appeal to the rhetoric of natural laws but fail to access their true power). It is a robust, critical black natural law tradition, as crafted by these interpretations of Douglass, Cooper, Du Bois and King Jr., that relies on stable and nonnegotiable laws as sources for our most soul-affirming ethical commitments and humanizing political criticisms. The black natural law approach also avoids the paralyzing problems of skepticism and relativism.
Lloyd’s interpretive historical account of these figures invites us to consider new dimensions of the rich style of black political rhetoric. Yet, the definitive readings of Douglass, Cooper, Du Bois and King as stylists of natural law renders them unidimensional and, to my mind, actually weakens the argument for Lloyd’s black natural law interpretation. To over-determine their efforts in this way is to conceal the creative breadth of their efforts and to overstate their location inside of this tradition. A more nuanced interpretation would argue that these four figures strategically used natural law rhetoric within the larger goals of their work.1 This might more compellingly establish the style of black natural law as a strand within the broader traditions of black religious activism.
Further, on a separate but related criticism, Lloyd does not provide an explicit argument for the rationale behind the specific choice of his four exemplars. At times, other religiously inspired political workers, for example Denmark Vesey, David Walker, Al Sharpton, and Ella Baker, use rhetoric that resembles the normative claims of the black natural law tradition that Lloyd aims to construct (they center the Judeo-Christian God and eternal laws). Vesey, Walker, Sharpton and Baker are generally not, however, considered mainstream thinkers. Does Lloyd’s tradition of black natural law only apply to the mainstream of black political and ethical thought? If so, what features make a black religio-political worker too radical for inclusion in the black natural law tradition that Lloyd constructs? The question of what exactly is illuminated by the description of the figures he chooses as stylists of black natural law would be resolved if he were to tell us the reasons behind his choices.
It also strikes me that against Lloyd’s numerous criticisms of neo-pragmatism and multiculturalism, a specific pragmatist bent and set of “multicultural” tendencies actually inhabit both the method of discernment and the “blackening” of the natural law tradition that he describes.2To acknowledge the multicultural and pragmatic aspects built into his distinctive natural law interpretation given here would serve to moderate the intense critical stance he takes toward neo-pragmatism and multiculturalism. It would also mitigate the most basic criticisms of neo-pragmatists and multiculturalists regarding natural law: that truth is always contingent therefore the very idea of natural law is hubris, and that racial and ethnic differences are products of distinct histories and require idiosyncratic, not universal, solutions. Since Lloyd takes historical truths to be dynamic and appreciates nuanced responses to human difference, he has little to lose by bringing them into his own method.
Before turning to the aspirational strand of the text, I want raise two related points of confusion regarding the descriptive features of the argument. On one hand, Lloyd contends that “black natural law” does not “derive from any facts about race” (xiii) and that it should not “take as its starting point the circumstances and capacities of a certain community” (158). At the same time, he characterizes black natural law as a “distinctively black tradition” and writes that blacks have “privileged access to” it (xiii). He says he wants “the epistemic privilege of the oppressed,” but the oppression he describes is always—as he very well knows—racialized. I have difficulty, however, holding the idea that natural law can be adjectivized as “black” but that it does not derive from any fact about race.
From where does politico-ethical critique arise if not from “circumstances and capacities of a certain community” (158)? While I agree that any process of discernment that gets to “the stable center of our humanity” is useful, it strikes me that interpreting King, Du Bois, Cooper and Douglass—who understood themselves as fully embodied subjects immersed in distinct sociopolitical circumstances—as not starting from “circumstances and capacities of a certain community” (158) actually obfuscates their achievements. It diminishes their extraordinary efforts to be both deeply present to actual conditions of dehumanization and always looking beyond them for more affirming means of human organizing.
Turning to the second, aspirational thread of the text, Lloyd contends that “black natural law” is the “best way to approach politics” (ix). He believes its theological commitments and metaphysical foundations relieve late-modern political detachment and moral confusion. Black natural law method removes the human subject from having to take full responsibility for separating good and bad laws and eliminates the human errors that occur when (self-interested) humans try to identify just from unjust acts. For example, it follows that Lloyd holds that the black natural law approach would lighten the burden of organizers, say, those working under the banner of Black Lives Matter, from having to craft an argument for racial equality based solely on empirical data and derived strictly from identity-based calls for justice. Lloyd would rather these activists appeal to higher laws inscribed in the nature of the universe in their justice work. In this way, the unchanging, absolute and stable moral tenets of the universe would guide Black Lives Matter organizers, who would then direct their listeners to a better discernment of partially obscured moral Truths. In this way, the universal laws demanded by our shared human condition would govern social movement organizing; Black Lives Matter activists would cease to operate out of the racial conditions in which they are mired.
On the one hand, I think Lloyd is correct: attempts to elevate human consciousness beyond immediate sociopolitical conditions are useful for justice work. On the other hand, this kind of transcendence is neither a necessary or sufficient condition for expanding rights and improving the quality of life in the United States. In fact, the Christian “elevation of consciousness” he prefers has been a feature of black political work throughout American history. African American struggles for equality in the United States feature numerous activists, like those in women’s clubs, school teachers, union organizers, ministers and others, who persistently reminded their supporters that they were more than the events they faced and greater than the conditions that produced them. This distinctive form of engagement with the identity-politics at the core of modernity has been a feature of African American life. In both its most elite political articulations (King, Cooper, Du Bois, Douglass) and its more folksy expressions (Booker T. Washington, Mary McCleod Bethune, Huey P. Newton), transformative African American political work begins with an identity-based call for justice that is deeply other-regarding.
Howard Thurman provides another way to think about this unique African American quest for transcendence. In his tracing of the moral history of Jesus (in Jesus and the Disinherited [1948]), Thurman details the history of the black sojourn in America as best understood when we consider how black subjects were able to generate an ethic of love from the psycho-cultural circumstances of oppression and sociopolitical conditions of being disinherited. For Thurman, as for Lloyd, the symbol “God” calls us to the “better angels of our nature,” directs us to our higher selves, and animates aspects of our personality that are greater than our social conditions. Yet Thurman’s vision of this development, unlike Lloyd’s, requires being fully grounded in social facts and taking them as one’s point of departure.
Due to the dynamic nature of politics and the shifting political needs and strategies of citizens on the margins, it is difficult to thoughtfully consider strong assertions regarding any singular, best overall approach to politics. What may work for one issue at a particular time in light of the needs of a particular community, may not work for another issue at another time for a different set of communal needs. Lloyd’s speculative claim that black natural law is the overall best approach to an ethical politics must, then, be understood as polemical. In chapter 5, “Decline and Detritus,” he describes why the tradition he has outlined has declined but he does not directly engage the best arguments against the natural law tradition itself. This leaves the text vulnerable to a slew of potential criticisms; the two most glaring ones are the practical problems of applying natural law solutions, and the value of moral realism in our late-modern moment, that is, after the insights gleaned from the linguistic turn, existentialism, and post-structuralism.
The problem of the application of black natural law is raised but not addressed in Lloyd’s recounting of Martin Luther King Jr.’s debate with James J. Kilpatrick in 1960 (100). Lloyd notes that in both the televised debate, as well as in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, King Jr. argued that the proper discernment of God’s law would lead to a greater understanding of human equality, which supported the demand for full and immediate integration of black people into all aspects of American life. Alternatively, Kilpatrick claimed that correct discernment of God’s law enlightened us to the fundamental differences between black and white people, their comfort in being separated, their quest for racial self-preservation, and thus, the continuation of racial segregation in America. These two positions illuminate a fundamental tension within the method of natural law: its lack of a formal means to adjudicate between competing claims regarding the just discernment of higher law. What is the final court of appeal for the clash between King’s position, that higher law demands racial integration, and Kilpatrick’s position, that higher law demands racial segregation?
Lloyd might respond that black natural law includes ideology critique, which, in this case, demonstrated that unjust laws were laws imposed by a majority on a minority (without their consent) that granted privileges to the majority (that the minority did not receive). This, however, does not settle the question of the morality of segregation, it merely settles the issues of consent and unequal privileges (that is, a minority group could consent to “separate, but equal”). Further, ideology critique and social movement organizing are not robust ways to attend to thorny problems like gay marriage and transgender bathrooms; nor, do they effectively speak to the facts of disproportionate pay for women doing the same job as men or the ban on Syrian refugees.
It is hard to hold black natural law as the best style of ethico-political engagement for our time because it is a form of moral realism, and this approach—as Lloyd notes in chapter 5—has gone out of style. Lloyd, however, is convinced that our best way out of our modern predicament is to turn to objective, real moral laws. He allows that these universal, unchanging moral laws are never discoverable in full and that on the ground, laws are fluid (e.g., who the state will consent to be married). Yet he is committed to the position that higher laws are not fungible (e.g., the true nature of marriage). One problem with this account is that conflicts about higher law are merely conflicts regarding proper discernment. This leaves disagreeable parties with nowhere to turn. Black natural law provides no final arbiter between human subjects to help make progress in the face of absolute claims for higher law. What remains, then, is only a power struggle; one that requires not just ideology critique and social movement organizing but protest and resistance against principalities and powers that have a long history of punishing those who resist them.
While we might romanticize the nonviolent protest of the Civil Rights strategists, we must be very careful here: our epoch is not the era of Martin Luther King Jr. (or Cooper, Douglass or Du Bois, for that matter). African American communities are both more diverse and more fractured than they have ever been. This diversity and its concomitant relativism, pragmatism and multiculturalism seem to trouble Lloyd. This may be because he does not acknowledge the imperial language of Afro-Protestantism, which, in the minds of many black people, resembles a tool of capitalist oppression more than it does one for black liberation. In many ways, God-talk itself seems to have run its course for a black radical politics. Black women have long protested patriarchal conceptions of racial freedom reproduced by Black churches. Additionally, Black LGBTQ folks have been dehumanized by so called “charismatic” black male preachers and the repressive morality of their institutions that are largely trans-phobic and excessive promoters of conservative family values. Add to this the fact that the coercive power of the state is more deadly, the strength of its surveillance more intense, and the power of its repressive apparatus more swift. These factors suggest that one must be careful trumpeting any absolutist claims for God’s law as the basis for justice.
I’m on board with the noble aspirations of a rhetorical style and a method of religio-political engagement that pulls us beyond ourselves in ways that mitigate unjust laws that diminish the quality of life. Whether or not the theological language of the tradition of black natural law as it is described here can mobilize a wide swath of the American public, is another question. This does not mean that we cannot aspire to the better angels of our nature by using narratives that remind us of the best of our spiritual imagination, it just means that the problems of justification built into the natural law framework, the historical disharmony created by the clash of so called “self-evident” truths, and the pain that the black Christian heritage has caused to non cis-gendered black men, make it less than possible that the black natural law framework will play a central role in raising the quality of life, in any significant way, in the United States.
The task for African Americans is not to attempt to discern God’s law more effectively, it is to coordinate their interests better (that is, to work in better solidarity with similarly interested groups) and to reconcile with a more expansive sense of self (that is, to be in closer contact with what Howard Thurman calls “whole feeling”). In this way the radical religious heritage of African descended peoples may be able to support energies that counter the brutal forces of global capitalism, which limit the possibilities of so many human beings by trapping them in cycles of poverty and wage-slavery, conditions that diminish the capacities of the human soul.
For example, one might say that a distinctive understanding of natural law informed King’s evangelical theology of the cross, but to collapse his entire method and lump all of his influences under the umbrella of this creative concept of natural law is to overstate. I also wonder why other reasonable interpretive options for these figures that function to illuminate and connect important facets of their work are not discussed, for example, interpretations that situate them as: prophetic black leaders, civil rights activists, freedom fighters, etc. Their work is not reducible to any one strategy.↩
Here I’m thinking of statements like: “the particular targets of this critique and organizing vary depending on what problems are most pressing at a given moment” (xiii); and “working that ineffable point indefinitely, always failing, trying to fail better” (158).↩
6.5.17 | Luke Bretherton
Response
Black Natural Law as Performance and Rationality
This is a brave book that reframes discussion of both natural law and the analysis of race in a theological key. My response begins by discussing how Lloyd situates Black natural law in relation to other traditions of natural law, as this is a central focus of the book. It then locates Black natural law as an approach to race in relation to other political traditions, notably, black nationalism. And I end by trying to understand what kind of book this is so as to understand how the book performs an argument as much as it makes an argument.
Let me begin by laying out what I take to be Lloyd’s central thesis. For Lloyd, the Black natural law tradition (BNL) is a “style of ethical and political engagement” (viii) as much as it is a set of conceptual judgments about the nature and form of human flourishing. As a style of ethical and political engagement it emerges from reflection on human nature as experienced within conditions of systemic oppression and the work of organizing done to end this oppression. The argument is that the oppressed, of which African Americans are a paradigmatic instance, have an epistemic privilege in determinations of human nature (ix). Failure to grant this epistemic privilege leads to mystified and false constructions of human nature that reinscribe unjust systems and oppressive forms of life. As a mode of natural law thinking BNL has a normative conception of what it means to be human, one grounded in theistic conceptions of all humans as made in the image of God, which can be appealed to as part of challenging idolatrous, hegemonic constructions of what it means to be human that privilege some and exclude others. White supremacy, and its manifestation in such systems as the criminal justice system, is one such idolatrous construction of human nature that BNL critiques, capitalism is another. This argument is set out through discussions of four “canonical” figures who embody in their lives Lloyd’s thesis. These figures are: Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, W. E. B. Du Bois, and Martin Luther King Jr. The book closes with a declension narrative focused on how the BNL tradition fragmented and dissolved subsequent to the assassination of Martin Luther King.
Lloyd oscillates between envisaging Black natural law (BNL) as a unique tradition incommensurable with other natural law traditions and envisaging it as a paradigmatic exemplar of natural law thinking that has distinct characteristics against which all other traditions of natural law thinking must be judged (e.g., ix, xiii). A case could be made either way. If it is the former some account is needed of how BNL is part of wider developments in Africana philosophy and whether it should be understood as emerging out of older traditions of what Henry Odera Oruka calls “African sage philosophy.” Such an account would fit with Lloyd’s MacIntyrian argument about how BNL is incommensurable with other natural law traditions (154–55). However, the argument that BNL is incommensurable seems to be contradicted by the evidence of all the figures Lloyd himself discusses, each of whom draws on and makes use of European philosophy and theology in creative and explicit ways. To insist on incommensurability would entail disregarding the testimony of those whom Lloyd puts forward as canonical figures within BNL.
If, however, BNL is taken to be a paradigmatic form of natural law against which all other traditions of natural law thinking should be judged, it becomes a singular and very powerful form of immanent critique. Connections can also then be made to parallel projects of immanent critique, most notably Eugene Rogers’s recent work on natural law.1 What Lloyd plots are the epistemic conditions for natural law to take account of idolatrous systems and oppressive cultures in the formulation of what is taken to be human nature. The BNL tradition exemplifies these conditions (e.g., 23, 68, 72).
Working with such conditions, and using BNL as a paradigm, let me suggest some connections and parallels that can be made to developments in what Lloyd calls the “European, Christian natural law” tradition. For this purpose I will focus on Catholic social teaching as a primary articulation of natural law reasoning in Europe. Arguably, Catholic social teaching is initiated by wrestling with the experience of impoverished and oppressed industrialized workers across Europe in the nineteenth century. Attention to this experience generates Rerum Novarum in 1893, spawns the ressourcement of Thomist conceptions of natural law, the rejection of “throne and altar” political theologies, and the adoption of democracy as a primary marker of good political order.2 However, failures to further extend this epistemic privilege leads to breakdowns in the rationality of Catholic social teaching and calls for its renewal. The Vatican’s response to Latin American Liberation Theology from the 1970s onwards can be seen as a fight over who is granted epistemic privilege and is settled by the recognition of the Vatican that a “preferential option for the poor” is central to any determination of what constitutes human flourishing. An engagement between Catholic social teaching and BNL points both to parallels but also the need for Catholic social teaching to be instructed by BNL, particularly in relation to white supremacy and the symbiosis between the development of phronesis and what Lloyd calls in places social movement organizing.
The book, however, begs the question as to whether natural law can be saved by the salve Lloyd proposes: namely, attention to the epistemic privileging of the oppressed, involvement in social movements and anchoring it metaphysically in an abstract theism. James Cone stands in an ambiguous relation to Lloyd’s argument in this regard. Lloyd praises Cone for his early work and the way it was paradoxical. He criticizes Cone for his subsequent embrace of “contextual” theology and a move towards a “theology of multiculturalism that ultimately also embraces secularism” (160). Yet Cone is most paradoxical when he is most christological. Cone’s statement that racism is a demonic force and Black Power a form of exorcism points to a christological analysis of what needs to happen for liberation from oppression.3 Cone makes an analogy between Jesus’s acts of exorcism and the significance of Black Power. On Cone’s account, as well as a means of survival, Black nationalist and Black Power efforts to form a nation within a nation can be understood as theo-political gestures of exorcism within the wider body politic.4 The confession of Jesus Christ as savior and how this confession presents a crisis to all other ways of knowing the world is not addressed in Lloyd’s book. Yet all the figures discussed are shaped in one way or another not just by involvement in social movements or experiences of oppression but also by Christian confession, either their own or of those around them. So is natural law and a vague theism enough? Or is there a need for a more determinant sense of the revelation of God given in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ in Lloyd’s conception of natural law? The book invites this question even while its focus is elsewhere.
The mention of Cone and Black Power raises the question of how to understand Lloyd’s claim that BNL is the majority and mainstream tradition of black political thought in North America. Even within the terms the book sets for itself, this is a claim that needs much further substantiation. An absent presence in the text is what most black political theorists judge to be the primary discursive tradition of US black political thought: black nationalism. To define what I am referring to let me draw on Michael Dawson’s distinction between three overlapping ways of conceptualizing what it means to be the black nation:
Even though the form black nationalism took varied, the basic goal was the same: to form a demos/people capable of, in the first instance, surviving; in the second instance, resisting; and finally, thriving within an oppressive system that refuses to see, hear, or talk about the dehumanizing impact it is having on others and on its white beneficiaries. As Dawson notes, black nationalism is a way to challenge the insider-outsider status of being the racialized other in North America that generates what Du Bois called “double consciousness.” This challenge operates on two fronts simultaneously: first, by claiming to be a nation, entry to and recognition within white channels of public discourse (whether mainstream, such as universities, or subaltern, such as the labor and women’s movement) is demanded; and second, by developing an alternative counter-public, space for critical reflection and self-cultivation (a form of life within which to live and move more freely) is provided.6 The claim to be a nation, even a nation within a nation, is a claim to be all that being a nation invokes as a “social imaginary”: belonging, sense of place, a history, a future, self-determination, citizenship, and a distinctive culture. It is a claim to possess a way of being in the world that lives an alternative to and refuses racialized constructions of blackness as a form of non-being and an anti-type of the good citizen.
Within Lloyd’s book key figures within black nationalism pop up—notably Martin Delany and Marcus Garvey, as well as Stokely Carmichael, who is briefly critiqued (120–21)—but black nationalism is not named, let alone discussed. It would be helpful to hear how Lloyd situates BNL in relation to one or another of the forms of black nationalism Dawson identifies. As it stands, Lloyd seems to position BNL as achieving the same things as being a nation.
Further attention to the intersection between black nationalism and BNL problematizes Lloyd’s identification of Black Power as the forbear of multiculturalism and secularism and the progenitor of the emergence of a middle-class, black intellectual elite who represent the fragmentation and decline of the BNL tradition. His account does not reckon with how the Black Power movement mixed sacred and profane, public and private, the vernacular and the formal, theory and practice, and refused modern European attempts to separate pursuit of the true, the good, and the beautiful. “Black is beautiful” is a simultaneously political, economic, ethical, spiritual, and aesthetic statement that was performed in rap and ballet, hairstyles and poetry, political polemics and preaching. Rather than a form of secularist multicultural discourse, Black Power can be seen as a form of “post-secular” politics avant la lettre. This is exemplified in a figure like Albert Cleage who is central to the emergence of Black Power as a social movement. Cleage’s critique of white supremacy is explicitly theological, does make normative claims about human flourishing, and is tied to specific forms of community organizing and electoral politics. He thereby contests Lloyd’s declension narrative.7
Let me shift focus from specific points of contention to a consideration of what kind of book this is. If the book is read as a monograph, setting out a detailed analysis with carefully substantiated claims based on evidence to warrant those claims and situated within a wider set of scholarly disputes, then problems abound. For example, it is not clear why Lloyd’s framing of W. E. B. Du Bois as a proponent of the black natural law tradition is better than either Cedric Robinson’s reading of Du Bois as mediating the engagement between what Robinson calls “the Black radical tradition” and Marxism, or Cornel West’s situating of Du Bois within American pragmatism, or Gary Dorrien’s identification of Du Bois with the Social Gospel. None of these or other accounts of Du Bois are engaged and the evidence given for Du Bois as drawing on natural law is at times tenuous. And at no point is a justification given for why Frederick Douglass, Anna Julia Cooper, Du Bois, and Martin Luther King Jr. should be considered “canonical” (159). Moreover, the lack of definition of the term “community organizing” and its deployment to describe radically different kinds of political engagement was frustrating. And I have no doubt that scholars of natural law will be driven to apoplectic distraction by the sweeping characterization given of the “European, Christian natural law tradition” (4). But Lloyd explicitly eschews detailed intellectual and social history because he wants to keep in view a clear line of argument. At the same time, he recognizes the need for it to substantiate various points he is making (e.g., 119, 127).
To understand the nature of this book it is important to attend to how Lloyd is constantly directing the reader’s attention to how genre, style, and rhetoric are vital to discerning the arguments being developed by the figures he discusses. And we cannot understand why genre and rhetoric are so important unless the figures are themselves situated within the forms of political engagement that informed and embodied their understanding of natural law. As Lloyd puts it, to understand the account of natural law someone like Frederick Douglass develops “requires careful attention to both form and content, to rhetoric and argument, to principle and strategy—and to how all of these are entwined” (3).
Lloyd, then, seems to want to invite the reader to engage his book as a richly suggestive essay rather than as an academic monograph. To treat it as a monograph is to miss entirely the performative dimension and rhetorical function of the book which Lloyd himself makes clear is crucial to understanding the BNL tradition (e.g., 90). The book echoes and performs the BNL tradition, which is not mediated by detailed philosophical analysis carried out by professors in ivory towers. It emerges from speeches, stories, letters, poems, and essays, written in the midst of and as a response to urgent political work to end injustice. Like this book, these writings were written to be read as part of enabling shared action.
Attention to the role of genre, style and rhetoric enable a notable feature of Lloyd’s book to come into view; that is, the absence of technical, jargon-heavy and often idiosyncratic terms beloved of critical race and other social theorists. Lloyd writes with a pellucid prose that is a pleasure to read. The style of the writing thereby performs not only his account of BNL but also his critique of other theological and philosophical accounts of white supremacy, for example, Afro-pessimism. For Lloyd, the prolix and obscurantist nature of such accounts reflect how they are disembedded from and often antithetical to black religious traditions and black-led constructive forms of social movement organizing. Therein they fail the essential purpose of writing that, as Lloyd notes in relation to Du Bois, “is to persuade” (59). In contrast to BNL, they emerge from “black intellectual elites whose political and cultural views are closely aligned with the liberalism or radicalism of white intellectual elites” (119).
There is much more that could be said and I very much look forward to reading other responses to this bold and creative book, and I greatly appreciate the opportunity to argue with and think alongside it. My hope is that at least some of what I have said might be a constructive catalyst for further reflection.
Eugene Rogers, Aquinas and the Supreme Court: Race, Gender, and the Failure of Natural Law in Thomas’s Biblical Commentaries (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).↩
On this, see Luke Bretherton, “Democracy, Society, and Truth: An Exploration of Catholic Social Teaching,” Scottish Journal of Theology 69.3 (2016): 267–80.↩
James H. Cone, Black Theology and Black Power (Maryknoll: Orbis 1997 [1969]), 41‒42.↩
Ibid., 42‒43↩
Michael C. Dawson, Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 91. Marcus Garvey is an example of the first, Martin Delany the second, and LeRoi Jones (before he became Amiri Baraka) the third. For an alternative typology to Dawson’s, see John T. McCartney, Black Power Ideologies: An Essay in African-American Political Thought (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 111‒32. What Dawson misses is the “cosmopolitan” dimension of most Black nationalisms. The constitution of the Black nation/people operated in both a local and a global register. For example, revolutionary nationalists located their struggle within broader anti-colonial and cross-class struggles elsewhere in the world. Whereas for others, self-determination was framed in terms of being part of a Muslim umma, or Africana diaspora, or worldwide class solidarity.↩
Dawson, Black Visions, 27‒28. On the dual role of counter-publics as means of incorporation, see Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil Sphere (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 275–77.↩
Cleage is not an isolated figure. Others include Reverend Arthur Brazier and Minister Franklin Florence.↩
6.5.17 | Vincent Lloyd
Reply
Response to Bretherton
It is always a pleasure to have intellectual exchange with Luke Bretherton, whose scholarship has taught me much over the years. A careful reader, Bretherton calls our attention to aspects of Black Natural Law that are in need of clarification, and he offers a way of understanding the intervention that the book aims to make that is sympathetic and elucidating.
In general, Bretherton seems to want assurances that there is space in my story for figures from the Black political tradition who are usually seen as more radical than the figures with whom I engage. I certainly am sympathetic to this desire; indeed, in the introduction to Anti-Blackness and Christian Ethics (Orbis, fall 2017), Andrew Prevot and I ask, “How might we understand the black radical tradition as a black religious radical tradition—or a black Christian radical tradition?” In that volume, we attempt a collective answer; in my book Religion of the Field Negro (Fordham, fall 2017), I develop my own response, beginning with Malcolm X and Albert Cleage and proceeding to chapters critically engaging with James Cone, Steve Biko, Huey Newton, Sylvia Wynter, and others. That book is framed as a prolegomena to a systematic Black theology (arguing, along the way, that the prolegomena is the systematic theology itself). Black Natural Law is a different sort of project: highlighting the political-theological dimensions of the mainstream Black political tradition and showing how doing so brings out the radical core of that tradition.
Bretherton worries that this attempt to explicate a tradition is torn between an investment in the incommensurability of tradition, on the one hand, and the claim that the Black natural law tradition is paradigmatic, on the other. He further worries that Black political leaders’ appropriation of “European philosophy and theology” undermines the claim to incommensurability, and so he chooses to embrace the claim that Black natural law is paradigmatic while setting aside the claim of incommensurability. We lack the space to dive into philosophical arguments about incommensurability here, but I would just point out that it seems quite plausible that we could observe a dramatically different society that seems relatively egalitarian or relatively elitist, or where elites are constantly being overthrown, while also acknowledging that the words, concepts, and even feelings of that society are so different than ours that we cannot even begin to understand them.
I certainly do not expect that it is possible for readers living lives of relative privilege to translate specific concepts or feelings native to the Black American experience into their own. (I tried to avoid graphic accounts of violence that would elicit empathy encouraging the sense of commensurability.) Rather, I tried to draw attention to the second-order question of how performance, rhetoric, reason, affect, and imagination all work together in a particular way in this tradition to motivate challenges to elites. The answer to that second-order question is what I take to be exemplary, teaching a lesson to all. While such a lesson might be heard by all, I doubt that it can be put into practice by those who are not participating in marginalized traditions, for traditions that are not marginalized quickly dismiss (or co-opt) attempts at ideology critique and serious organizing that would challenge elites. This is why I conclude in the book that conversion to a marginalized tradition is necessary—as the only way to rightly access natural law and so to participate in the good, the true, and the beautiful.
“The confession of Jesus Christ as savior” strikes Bretherton as important to Christian engagements in politics and to the four protagonists of my book in particular. He contrasts this “confession” with a “vague theism” about which I write. In fact, the kind of theism that the Black natural law tradition advocates is not “vague” at all but quite akin to “confession.” It is a commitment to challenge every attempt to name God with worldly terms, and at the same time it is a commitment to pursue that which escapes worldly terms (i.e., to have faith). I do not introduce specifically Christological or Trinitarian terminology in this book, but I attempt to present the tradition in a way that is open to that sort of terminology, and I hint at how some of the protagonists of my story use such terminology (e.g., Du Bois on his son).
I take Black nationalism to be a concept that is sometimes employed in Black political engagement. When it is employed depends on context: it is a tool that helps with some problems and not with others. As I try to show, the Black natural law tradition employs all sorts of tools (concepts, rhetorics, tactics, etc.), and practical wisdom concerning which tools to employ in which cases is essential. In other words, I do not worry about overlooking a tradition of Black nationalist politics just as I do not worry about overlooking a tradition of Black pacifism: they are tactics rather than traditions, even if they are sometimes elevated to a tradition-like status by the clunky conceptual distinctions of political scientists.
Bretherton asserts that “the evidence given for Du Bois as drawing on natural law is at times tenuous,” and he notes that Du Bois could equally be read as part of a pragmatist, Black radical, or social gospel tradition. Similar claims could be made of all the protagonists of Black Natural Law. Why bring them together and assert that they are part of a unified tradition? In part, it is to offer a new story of natural law that de-centers Europe. But it is also to show how there was a distinctive style of political engagement in Black America that seriously engaged with religious ideas and that grew organically from Black Christianity and Black experience of marginalization. It is certainly harder to make a case for this story than for others, but it is also more necessary—because it is a story from the grassroots, rooted in oral tradition and performance that only occasionally and fleetingly enter the archive.