Robert Lane’s Peirce on Idealism and Realism is a synthetic book—in it, Lane argues that Peirce accepted a “dual-aspect” account of truths. Lane’s line is that there is, given Peirce’s views on meaning, inference, representation, and inquiry, room for both a form of “basic realism” and “basic idealism” in Peirce’s theory. Basic realism is simply that “there is a world that is the way it is regardless of whether you, or I, or anyone else believes that it is that way.” This basic thought about reality is what explains what other scholars have interpreted as an epistemic theory of truth behind Peirce’s convergence theory that truth is what is believed at the end of inquiry. This view, then, Lane holds, is consistent with a form of basic idealism, because “anything real can be represented in ideas, thoughts, cognitions, etc.” This view is certainly controversial among Peirce scholars, as it commits Peirce to a form of representationalism about truth, which many pragmatists aver. And it tracks a single line of development for Peirce on truth, which many also have taken to be a more broken path. Lane’s book is a rewarding challenge not only to Peirce scholars but to anyone working in the pragmatist idiom on knowledge, metaphysics, and truth.